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Abstract
Toward A Behavioral Model of Management
Under Collective Bargaining
by
Thomas A. Kochan
The elements of a behavioral model of management in a collective bargaining
relationship are presented in this paper. The model is cast within the plural-
ist normative assumptions that underliethe study and practice of industrial re-
lations and collective bargaining in the United States. The model integrates
propositions from the organizational behavior, collective bargaining, and per-
sonnel and human resource management literatures to explain variations in the
policies, structures, and goals of employers. Variations in these employer
characteristics are then related to the traditional dependent variables studied
within collective bargaining: (1) the process of negotiations, (2) the outcomes
of bargaining, (3) the administration of the bargaining agreements, and (4) the
process of change within a collective bargaining relationship. It is argued
that the ultimate objective of the model should be to explain the effects of
management policies and behavior on the goals and interests of the employer,
the employees, the union, and the public.
The study of management under collective bargaining has been neglected by
North American scholars in recent years. This paper hopes to stimulate renewed
interest in this area. Data from a study of American managers are used to pro-
vide an empirical basis for building the model.
TOWARD A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF MANAGEMENT
UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
by
Thomas A. Kochan*
Considerable progress was made in the last decade in integrating the be-
havioral sciences into the study of various industrial relations topics. Papers
presented at this conference demonstrate that perhaps the most progress was made
in developing behavioral models of the negotiations process, strikes and impasses
and the various procedures for conflict resolution. Behavioral models of the
organizational characteristics of trade unions, particularly their structure, in-
ternal democracy, membership participation, and overall effectiveness have also
been developed (Child, Loveridge, and Warner, 1973; Anderson, 1977). Models of
organizational change under collective bargaining have been proposed (Kochan and
Dyer, 1976) and the process of changing the work environment in unionized organ-
izations has been studied empirically (Goodman, 1979).
One of the areas of industrial relations that has not yet been systematically
addressed by behavioral researchers is the study of management under collective
bargaining. In fact, the study of management under collective bargaining has
generally been neglected by North American scholars since the classic study by
Slichter, Healy, and Livernash (1960).
The purpose of this paper is to take a first step toward a model of the
role of behavior of management under collective bargaining. The paper will apply
some of the principles outlined in an earlier review paper, (Kochan, 1980a) for
moving toward a stronger integration of behavioral science theories, concepts,
and techniques into the study and practice of collective bargaining and industrial
relations. Some descriptive data collected in a survey of over 600 private sector
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firms by the U.S. Conference Board (Freedman, 1979) will be used to illustrate
the need and the potential for the kind of theory and research advocated here.
Type of Model Needed
In an earlier paper (Kochan, 1980a) I argued that the behavioral sciences
have a potentially important role to play in improving our understanding and in
influencing the practices of industrial relations at the micro (organizational)
level. To realize this potential, models or theories of the middle range are
needed that (1) are sensitive to the normative premises underlying the study
and practice of industrial relations and (2) focus on the key outcomes of in-
terest to industrial relations scholars and practitioners. Too often, behavioral
scientists have been insensitive to the diversity of interests represented at
the workplace and have failed to adequately understand the nature of labor-man-
agement relations and collective bargaining. Consequently, the models that have
been developed within mainstream organizational behavior have often been too
abstract or general, or have failed to understand the issues of central concern
in industrial relations, thereby limiting their utility for industrial relations
researchers, policymakers, or practitioners. Consequently, this paper will start
by first laying out some of the normative considerations that are relevant
to the study of management under collective bargaining, then present a general
model that helps identify where management characteristics and practices fit in-
to a collective bargaining system, and finally suggest some of the key questions
that a theory of management under collective bargaining should address. It is
hoped that this effort will provide a framework for guiding empirical research
on these issues and will help to stimulate renewed interest in this area.
Normative Perspectives
The material in this paper is oriented towards the American Collective
bargaining system. Thus, before beginning we should have an explicit statement
of what the normative premises are that guide research and public policy in
ill
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this area.
The normative premises underlying the U.S. system of collective bargaining
are derived from a pluralistic view of industrial relations (Kerr, Dunlop,
Harbison, and Myers, 1960); Barbash, 1964; Fox, 1971; Flanders, 1970). A partial
conflict of interest is assumed to exist between workers and their employers.
This conflict is derived from workers' drive for economic security, independence,
and control over workplace decisions and employer concerns for economic efficiency
and discretion and control over decision making. The conflict of interests is
viewed as inherent, permanent, and legitimate, yet both parties share a common
interdependence that requires periodic accomodation of their interests. Therefore,
there is an assumption that industrial relations decisions can best be arrived at
through negotiations, compromise and accomodation. Collective bargaining is one
means of structuring and regulating this decision making process.
For this process to work, both labor and management must accept the legitimacy
of the other party to the process, and indeed must be committed to making the
process work. The role of power is central to this pluralistic model. Indeed,
it will be argued here that the pluralistic model requires a minimum balance of
power between labor and management for the negotiations and accomodation process
to work effectively. Unless each party has sufficient power to require the other
to respond to its interests, the negotiations process will not be initiated or
sustained through time and the system will turn to one of unilateral determination
or paternalism.
Management's role under collective bargaining, therefore, is to not only
protect the efficiency and other managerial interests of the firm, but to also
contribute to the effective functioning of the bargaining system and to the im-
provement of the bargaining relationship. It is important to keep these norma-
tive assumptions in mind, since as will be discussed in more detail later, there
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is growing evidence that the normative assumptions regarding the role of manage-
ment underlying this pluralistic model are not entirely consistent with manage-
ment behavior in the U.S. Indeed, a major theme running through this paper is
that we must recognize even more than before that the key to making the plural-
istic model survive and work as a means of accomodating diverse interests is
that each party to the bargaining relationship must have sufficient power to
force the other party to accept the pluralistic norms and to generate and
sustain commitment to the bargaining system.
Theoretical Perspectives
Before developing the propositions concerning the role and behavior of
management, the broader theoretical model of collective bargaining must be out-
lined so that we are aware of where management characteristics fit within this
broader model. A general model of the collective bargaining system is presented
in Figure 1. Management characteristics are presented as intervening variables
that are affected by the external environment, the structure of bargaining, and
the organizational characteristics of the union. Together with these other
factors, management characteristics are seen as having an important effect on
four sets of traditional dependent variables of interest to collective bargaining
researchers, policymakers, and practitioners. These are: (1) the process of
negotiations, (2) the outcomes of bargaining, (3) the administration of the
agreement, and; (4) the process of change within a bargaining relationship.
These traditional dimensions of the bargaining system must then be evaluated
against the goals of individual workers, employers, and the public in order to
measure the performance of the bargaining system. A comprehensive understanding
of the role of management within this framework requires that we first explain
how variations in the characteristics and behavior of management are influenced
by other system characteristics and then relate these variables to the dependent
variables outlined above and to the goals of the parties and the public.
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Management Policies Towards Unions
A model of management under collective bargaining must begin with an analysis
of the overall policies of employers toward trade unions. Earlier it was noted
that one of the expectations that the pluralist model has for management is that
the legitimacy of trade unions and the collective bargaining process is accepted
and that management is committed to making the bargaining relationship perform
effectively. There are reasons, however, to question the validity of this gen-
eral assumption, both as it applies historically and currently to U.S. management.
Instead, the following more limited proposition appears to be more accurate: U.S.
management accepts the normative assumptions underlying the pluralist model only
when unions are sufficiently powerful to force the employer to engage in
collective bargaining.
In the U.S., management is generally a reluctant participant in collective
bargaining. The vast majority of firms have always vigorously opposed efforts by
unions to organize their employees. Brown and Myers (1957;92) described the
sentiments of the majority of American executives well in an article written
in the 1950s:
"...It may well be true that if American management, upon retiring
for the night, were assured that by the next morning the unions
with which they dealt would have disappeared, more management
people than now would experience the happiest sleep of their lives."
Yet, even given this generalized pattern of opposition, the intensity of
management resistance to unions, as well as the strategies used by employers
to remain non-union, have varied across firms and over time. Consequently,
the first task of a model of management under collective bargaining is to
attempt to explain both the intensity of management resistance to unions and
the variations in the strategies employed.
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Management Strategies for Avoiding Unions
Two distinct strategies for avoiding unions have been identified as far
back as the 1920s (Witte, 1954): (1) direct union suppression policies, and
(2) union substitution policies. Union suppression strategies are quite easily
described. The use of strike breakers, industrial spies, armed guards, black-
listing, and other forms of discrimination against union supporters have been
described by labor historians and journalists. Efforts to substitute for
unions by developing comprehensive personnel management policies first began to
appear in the post World War I time period. Employee representation plans,
company unions, and scientific management began to emerge partially as mechanisms
to reduce the incentive to turn to independent trade unions (Nadworthy, 1955;
Millis and Montgomery, 1945).
Although empirical evidence in this area is quite difficult to generate,
the same dual approaches to union avoidance appear to be present in the U.S.
today. Indeed, there seems to be a relatively systematic relationship between
the characteristics of the economic and organizational environments of employers
and the strategies used to avoid unions. Those environmental and organizational
conditions that appear to increase the probability that a firm will use a
direct suppression strategy are: (1) the presence of a hostile political and
social environment towards unions, (2) domination of the work force by low
wage unskilled workers with few labor market alternatives, (3) an abundant
supply of labor, (4) low recruitment and training costs, (5) low-profit--highly
competitive industries, (6) small plants, and (7) the absence of a professional
personnel staff.
In contrast, those firms that use a strategy of trying to reduce the
psychological and economic incentives for employees to organize are more likely
to be found in an environment of rapid growth, high profits, large scale pro-
duction and employ workers who have sufficient skills and/or training to
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warrant the investment of a professional personnel and human resource manage-
ment staff and program. Furthermore, firms employing this latter strategy
often use sophisticated behavioral science techniques to monitor employee
attitudes and economic welfare. In general, these firms tend to pay wages and
fringe benefits that are equal to or comparable to workers in the same labor
market, provide job security guarantees, and encourage the use of the most
innovative techniques for promoting communications, information sharing, and
development of trust and participation in decision making (Foulkes, 1980).
The evidence for these explanations of differences in strategies used to
keep out unions come largely from case studies (Foulkes, 1980; Berenbiem, 1980).
While there are no quantitative indicators, many people believe that management
is becoming increasingly aggressive and effective in its efforts to avoid
unions in the U.S. and that this increased management aggressiveness has had
a deleterious effect on the overall climate for collective bargaining.
Intensity of Management Resistance
Only very superficial evidence of the current level of intensity of
management opposition to unionization is available. The Conference Board
survey (Freedman, 1979; Kochan, 1980) showed that among firms that currently
have some employees organized "new union organizing" was ranked fourth in the
list of eight labor relations goals. Approximately ten percent of these firms
reported that avoiding union organizing was their top labor relations objective,
however, thirty percent indicated that this objective was among the top three
in importance to their firm. Twenty percent indicated this goal was not con-
sidered at all relevant to their firms. Those firms that gave this goal a
higher ranking were ones in which only a minority of their current employees
are organized. A -.43 correlation was obtained between a measure of the impor-
tance attached to avoiding further unionization and the percentage of current
employees unionized. When a sample of unorganized firms was examined, however,
almost all firms ranked avoidance of unionization as the most important labor
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relations objective. In addition, all firms, regardless of their degree of
organization among blue collar employees, indicated that they were opposed to
organization among their white collar and professional workers. Furthermore,
a number of journalistic reports have shown that even among firms that have
traditionally been highly unionized there is a growing tendency for employers
to vigorously oppose unionization when new plants are opened. This is in
contrast to the recent agreement signed by General Motors to extend automatic
recognition to employees in any new plant that the company opens in the future.
To date, what little work that has been done on the question of management
policies towards unions has been largely atheoretical. We do have the classic
historical study of Bendix (1964) that stresses the ideological bases of mana-
gerial opposition to unions in the U.S. His thesis may provide the overriding
explanation for generalized resistance to unions that we find among American
managers. The fact that managerial intensity of interests in avoiding union-
ization declines as the percentage of a firms' employees unionized increases,
suggest that managers make a pragmatic adaptation to unions, as union power in-
creases. We also have some evidence that management in the public sector has
been less vigorous in its opposition to unions than in the private sector. The
traditional explanation for this is that it is politically costly for public
sector management to vigorously oppose unions. All of this suggests a rather
simple overriding proposition: the intensity of managerial opposition to unions
in the U.S. is inversely related to the power a union can bring to bear on the
employer.
In any event, it is probably less important to understand why management
opposes unionization in the U.S. than it is to recognize that the opposition is
generally strong and then to relate variations in overall management policies
toward unions to their consequences for the collective bargaining system.
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There are those who believe that the intensity of managerial opposition poses
serious economic and social costs that constrain the ability of the collective
bargaining system to achieve many of the economic and social objectives of
workers, employers, and the public. All of this suggests that the study of
management policies toward unions is an important area for research for both
theoretical and policy related reasons. The overriding question that this research
needs to address is: what effects do aggressive managerial efforts to avoid
unions have on the rights, goals, and welfare of individual workers, trade unions,
and the public.
Structural Response of Management to Unions
Slichter, Healy, and Livernash (1960) proposed that the arrival of a union
leads to three managerial structural responses: (1) formalization of policies,
(2) specialization of decision-making, and (3) redistribution of power within the
management structure. In a more general sense, a union can be viewed as a form
of external pressure or environmental uncertainty that induces differentiation
within an organizational structure and encourages the establishment of specialized
boundary spanning units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). Again,
however, employers do not naturally or voluntarily adapt in this way as soon as
a union appears. A number of empirical studies have now shown that the degree
to which management engages in these structural adaptations is partially a
function of union power or pressure (Goldner, 1970; Kochan, 1975). At the same
time, it is clear that a good deal of managerial discretion exists over these
decisions since these environmental pressures can only explain a small percentage
of the variance in either the power of boundary spanning units (Kochan, 1975) or
even the size of the labor relations staff (Kochan, 1980b). Indeed, an effort
to relate the Conference Board data on managerial structure to characteristics
of the external environment that influence the power of the union was only
marginally successful in explaining the size of the labor relations unit and
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generally unsuccessful in explaining the degree of specialization of centrali-
zation of decision-making power.
One reason for the lack of ability to explain variance using these propo-
tions is that management generally views labor relations as a very strategic
function requiring a highly centralized decision making process. The key
strategic decisions over bargaining goals are made at the top levels of major
corporations (Freedman, 1979; Kochan, 1980b) while the operational aspects of
labor relations policy are often carried out as lower levels. It may also be
that environment-organizational response theorists understate the importance of
internal political conflicts that are generated whenever structural change is
being considered. Thus future research on the structural responses of employers
to trade unions should examine more closely the strategic considerations that
influence how an organization structures itself and coordinates its internal
decision-making process in bargaining with an adversary.
The Effects of Management Adjustments
The pressure for formalization of managerial policies arises from both
the need for the firm to absorb the uncertainty that a union brings into the
personnel and human resource planning function and the need to absorb the
expected economic costs of unionization to the firm. Econometric studies have
shown that, on average, American unions raise wages of their members between
ten and twenty percent (Rees, 1978; Kochan 1980b). Most of the recent studies
estimating the effects of unions on individual workers have found estimates
within the upper end of this range. This economic pressure creates what has
been referred to as a "shock effect" on management (Slichter, Healy, and Liver-
nash, 1960) that forces a search for additional productivity improving adjust-
ments within the firm. Alternatively, economists who subscribe to the neoclassical
model of the firm would argue that the effects of unions and collective bargain-
ing are to lower output, reduce employment opportunities for unionized workers
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and/or increase prices. Thus, the way management adjusts its policies to the
presence of a union has important implications for the ultimate effects of
collective bargaining on the economic goals of the firm, its employees and the
public. Management's response to unions will also influence the behavioral
aspects of the bargaining relationship since it will affect the climate and
level of trust that develops between the union and management leaders and the
attitudes of the workers toward their jobs, the employer and the union. Con-
sequently, the nature and effects of these managerial adjustments to unions is
an extremely important building block in a theory of management under collective
bargaining.
Figure 2 presents a three stage model for tracing the effects of unions and
these managerial adjustments on the economic and behavioral outcomes of in-
terest to the firm, to employees, and to the public. The first stage of the
model suggests that the major and primary effects of unions will be to improve
wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions. Management will then attempt
to respond by tightening up on work rules, introducing new technology, changing
the organization of the work or the allocation of workers, a raising the quality
of the workforce by either training existing workers or recruiting higher
quality employees. The extent to which management is successful in recouping
the increased costs of unionization through these managerial adjustments will
determine the effects of collective bargaining on productivity and costs, and
therefore, on employment, profits and prices. Thus, the ultimate effect of
collective bargaining on these outcomes is determined by the joint effects of
the power of the union to achieve gains for its members that increase costs and
the ability of the employer to find ways of absorbing these costs through
various managerial adjustments.
None of the managerial adjustments discussed above are neutral in terms
of their effects on goals and interests of the employees and the union. Conse-
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quently, a complete model of the effects of managerial adjustment to trade unions
must also examine their impact on such outcomes as the climate of the bargaining
relationship, strike activity, grievance rates, employee safety and health,
employee job satisfaction and related attitudes, turnover, absenteeism, and
employee psychological well-being.
Unfortunately, we have very little empirical evidence of the effects of these
managerial adjustments. Freeman and Medoff (1979) have recently reviewed a
series of studies conducted under their direction which show that the nature
of industrial relations within an industry appears to be directly related to
productivity. One study, for example, showed that on average unions in manufacturing
industries have a positive productivity effect. Another study that traced the
effects of unions on productivity in the coal mining industry showed, however,
that there was a positive productivity effect for the unionized sector in the
1950s when labor relations was stable (low rates of strikes, internal union
stability, and low rates of wildcat strikes) while in the 1970's the productivity
of nonunion sector exceeded that of the union sector. The authors attributed a
substantial part of this shift to the deterioration in labor relations that
occurred in coal mining in the most recent decade. These econometric studies
have outlined the dimensions of the task facing behavioral scientists. They have
shown that industrial relations seems to make a difference, and leave it to the
behavioralists the task of identifying the dimensions of the collective bargaining
relationship that influence productivity and, particularly, the managerial
policies and practices that play a role within this process.
A number of recent studies have looked at the effect of unions and collective
bargaining on job satisfaction and other measures of employee well-being under
collective bargaining. The dominant finding to date is that unions increase
satisfaction with the bread and butter issues of wages, job security, and fringe
benefits, but are negatively related to satisfaction with job content, supervision,
II
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resource adequacy, and challenge. (Hammer, 1979; Freeman, 1976; Kochan and
Helfman, 1979). Again these are simply cross sectional surveys of individual
workers which leave unexplained variations around the average union effect.
The challenge for behavioral scientists is to look at the variations within
the collective bargaining relationship that influence these results.
Management Behavior in Negotiations
The process of negotiations serves as one of the traditional dependent
variables in the study of collective bargaining. No effort will be made here
to develop a comprehensive model of the negotiations process. Other papers at
this conference address these issues. Instead, of central interest here is
the role that management characteristics, goals and behaviors have on negotia-
tions. One approach to exploring management effects on negotiations would be
to focus on the dynamics of internal management-decision making across the
various stages of negotiations process, (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Kochan, 1980b).
The employer representative is assumed to establish an initial set of targets
and/or resistance points for the outcomes of negotiations. These targets and
their subsequent modification in negotiations are influenced by external
environmental pressures, the power of the union, and employer policies. The
process of target setting and modification itself is viewed as an intraorgan-
izational bargaining and conflict resolution process. The task of the management
decision makers is to choose a position somewhere between their desired targets
and the targets of the union. The central question for a theory of this
internal decision making process is what factors influence the willingness of
the employer to adapt its preferences in bargaining so as to accomodate the
expectations and aspirations of the union?
We have some data and theory on what influences management's choices of
wage targets. The Conference Board data showed, for example, that as the power
of the union increases, and bargaining becomes more centralized, management
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adapted its wage criteria to conform more closely to the union's preferences for
industry level wage comparisons, and cost-of-living considerations, and places
less emphasis on management preferences for local labor market comparisons, and
ability to pay considerations. Almost no work has been done recently, however,
that examines management's preferences for other nonwage bargaining issues. This,
therefore, can be added to our agenda for future research on the role of manage-
ment under collective bargaining.
Another issue that must be addressed in a theory of management's impact on
the negotiation process is the effect of managerial characteristics on the
probability of an impasse or strike occurring in negotiations. Here some progress
has been made in research within the last few years. This research is reviewed
in the paper presented by Anderson at this conference and again need not be re-
viewed here.
The Administration of the Labor Agreement
Most discussions of the administration of labor management under collective
bargaining focus on the formal grievance procedure. Yet, it has always been
recognized that the formal procedure is only the most viable part of the day-
to-day employment relationship under collective bargaining and that it is
supplemented by a good deal of informal activity. A recent study of grievance
procedures in Great Britain (Thomson and Murray, 1976) developed a contingency
model for explaining variations in the dependence on formal legalistic adherence
to the grievance procedure and informal resolution of disputes. They suggested
a proposition that is well worth further development and empirical research:
The lower the level of trust and the more hostile the climate between the
employer and the union the more formal legalistic procedures take precedence
over informal resolution processes. The Brett and Goldberg (1979) study of
wildcat strikes in the coal industry support the argument that management labor
relations policies, and the degree of trust workers have in management, influcence
the use of the grievance procedures and the probability of wildcat strikes. If
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Fox (1974) is correct in arguing that the pluralistic model of industrial re-
lations leads to declining levels of trust within organizations and that this
declining trust level in turn leads to declining levels of performance within
an industrial relations system, then the study of the effects of trust and the
factors that influence its development is indeed an important one.
A number of studies have attempted to develop theories of grievance rates
or reliance on arbitration. Many of these apply the same general systems type
model that was outlined in Figure 1 (Peach and Livernash, 1975; Knight, 1979).
A number of studies have examined the effects of differences in leadership
styles of first line supervisors. Beyond these isolated examples, however,
there is little theory or empirical evidence on the effects of different manage-
ment characteristics on the administrative dimension of bargaining relationships.
Change in Collective Bargaining
Change does not come naturally to a collective bargaining system since there
are no strong economic incentives on the parties to make major changes in their
bargaining relationship as long as things are working as well as can be expected.
Both management and Union decision makers can be expected to engage in satisficing
rather than optimizing behavior (Simon, 1955). When change does occur, it is
often more incremental than dramatic and more sporadic than continuous in nature.
The weak incentive for introducing change as long as a satisfactory level of
performance is being achieved is reinforced by the high political risks
associated with change strategies to both union and employer representatives.
Given the difficulty of introducing change, it is not surprising that organ-
izational behavioral theorists have had difficulty in applying models of change
from psychology or organizational theory to the context of union-management
relations. One of the problems with efforts to apply models of this nature to
collective bargaining is that the researchers often have assumed that the change
process is inherently cooperative or integrative. In fact, two types of change
_1_ --·1_1-11111___1_
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processes can be distinguished in collective bargaining. The most common form
of change has come through protracted power struggles and through the use of
strikes or strike threats. Dubin (1954) noted that the strike and the strike
threat traditionally served as the major mechanism for introducing social change
in American industrial relations. More recently, (since 1960) the pressure for
change has also come from the passage of new laws and government regulations
effecting workplace conditions, compensation, and behavior. In contrast, most
behavioral science models of the change process assume a much more integrative
type of environment, set of issues, and process. Consequently, a complete model
of the change process under collective bargaining, and a better understanding
of the management variables that influence the change process and its outcomes,
must consider both of these types of processes. The first task of such a theory
should be to distinguish the conditions under which these types of processes are
most likely to occur.
All change models start with the assumption that for change to be initiated
some form of pressure or stimulus must be felt by the parties (Lewin, 1947).
In collective bargaining this stimulus or pressure can come from the external
environment in the form of economic pressures, government regulations, or
technological advances. Alternatively, it can come from either the union members
pressuring union leaders for change or from management pressuring for changes
which improve the economic performance of the organization or increase the dis-
cretion of management. Given some form of perceived pressure the question
then turns to which of the two forms of change are most likely to occur?
Social change through the formal negotiation process relying on the bargaining
power of the party initiating the change is more likely to occur when {1) the
issue is distributive in nature (that is, where the parties' goals are incom-
patible), (2) the outcome of the change process will alter the balance of power
between the parties, (3) the results of the process promise relatively certain
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benefits so that the cause and effect relations between the proposal and its
effects on the goals of the parties are well known and predictable, (4) where
the level of trust between the parties is realtively low, and (5) the political
positions of the leaders on both the union and the employers' side are unstable.
Under these conditions, the parties are likely to turn to the formal negotiations
process to achieve the desired changes. When management initiates this type of
change strategy, the critical variables that appear to affect its success are
(1) its ability and willingness to sustain a strike over the issue, (2) the degree
of centralization and coordination of the management effort so that internal de-
fections from the management position do not occur, and (3) the willingness of
management to protect the job security of the workers and the organizational
security of the union. This type of change process is most often found when the
issue is the introduction of new technology or the negotiation of major productivity
improvements (Levinson et al, 1970).
The alternative form of change, and the one that behavioral science is more
accustomed to, is a joint integrative type of problem-solving process that
supplements the formal negotiations of a new contract. This type of process is
most likely to occur when the target of the change effort is the climate of the
relationship, the level of trust between the parties, or the attitudes or behavior
of individual workers. This type of change process is also more likely to be
used when the benefits associated with the outcomes of change are less certain so
that more problem-solving efforts are needed to search for the optimal solution
to the problem, (2) neither party is seeking a major change in their existing
balance of power, (3) the political positions of the union and management officials
are relatively stable so that the process of cooperation or joint problem-sovling
does not threaten their political positions, and (4) the level of trust in the
bargaining relationship is already high. In this type of change process the degree
of management commitment has been identified as the major management variable that
_ _11______1_1_1__11·1__.
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influences the success of the process. In addition, management must be willing
to make the organizational structural adaptations needed to give sufficient
authority to the joint labor management committee or problem-solving group that
manages the change process. Finally, the benefits from the change process must
be shared in an equitable fashion between the management and the workers. This
type of strategy has been commonly advocated by those seeking to get unions and
employers to more aggressively address issues associated with the quality of
work, work place safety and health, and productivity.
This is a difficult form of organizational change to sustain within a collective
bargaining relationship because it requires continuous interaction and the
ability to sustain the periodic efforts to use the power-strike based form of
change in negotiations. Thus, this type of process is most likely to work during
the term of an agreement and is most seriously challenged as the time for negotiating
a new contract approaches. Since this type of process is more amenable to address-
ing problems associated with individual workers, this is the type of process where
behavioral scientists have the greatest potential for improving through a combination
of research and action. A substantial number of American managers are interested
in addressing problems of productivity and worker attitudes through some form of
change process (Freedman, 1979) yet they have been hesitant to do so because of
the risks associated with these efforts.
Conclusions and Implications
This paper has reviewed a very broad range of issues relevant to the study
of management under collective bargaining. An effort was made to both summarize
existing knowledge as well as to offer a series of questions and several propo-
sitions for further research. It is clear that the study of management under
collective bargaining will take on added importance in the coming years.
American employers face a critical strategic choice as they enter the 1980s.
During the 1970s many American employers displayed a declining commitment to
___ __1___·______11_______1111____1111__11 _·_( _.
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collective bargaining and an increasing willingness to put efforts and resources
into trying to keep their employees from organizing into trade unions. Yet,
the Conference Board survey clearly indicated that a majority of those firms
that are currently organized have adapted to the power of the unions they deal
with and are now less interested in trying to eliminate trade unions and more
interested in improving their performance within the bargaining relationship.
The nature of industrial relations in the U.S. in the 1980s will be partly
determined by which of two contending groups dominate management behavior:
those seeking to eliminate unions or those seeking to improve their performance
under bargaining. The 1980s should be a decade where behavioral scientists make
a major commitment to developing theories, empirical research, and strategies
for guiding those employers and unions who seek to employ the strategy of
improving the performance of their collective bargaining relationships.
The kind of middle range theories and empirical research efforts being
advocated here can make a contribution to both our understanding of the conse-
quences of these two alternatives and to the probability that employers will
succeed in whichever strategy they choose. Unfortunately, the dominat contri-
bution of behavioral science research in the 1960s and 1970s was to increase
the probability that those employers would succeed who chose the strategy of
strongly resisting trade unions. It is hoped by developing a better understanding
of the nature of collective bargaining, and particularly of the role and effects
of management behavior under collective bargaining, that the 1980s will be a
decade in which behavioral scientists help make it easier for employers to
choose the alternative strategy.
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